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During a 2016 criminal investigation overseen by 
the authors, a discovery was made that the Bing search 
engine was suggesting search terms known to be 
associated with child exploitation materials. This was in 
response to a non-contraband search by a subject, 
leading to increasingly explicit suggestions. This 
information led to the discovery that, with a user’s 
browser history files, the specific actions taken by a user 
could be isolated and tracked using Bing’s own unique 
URL parameters. While the suggestion of contraband 
terms by the Bing search engine has since ceased, there 
has been little to no research conducted on analyzing a 
user’s browser activity in order to determine their 
specific actions behind the keyboard through the use of 
these unique URL parameters. The purpose of this paper 
is to document Bing’s URL parameters related to image 
searches (specifically the FORM parameter) in order to 
detail how a user’s actions during searching may be 
determined by an analyst. The authors also provide a 
new tool for creating a timeline of Bing image search 
events when an analyst possesses a user’s browser 
history files. 
 
Disclaimer: Some portions of this article discuss 
words or language that are considered profane, vulgar, 
or offensive.  This article is neither a legal 
interpretation nor a statement of [agency redacted 
during review] policy. Reference to any specific product 
or entity does not constitute an endorsement or 
recommendation by the [agency redacted during 
review]. Views and opinions expressed by the authors 
are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect 
the view of the [agency redacted during review] or any 
of its officials. 
1. Introduction  
Federal law enforcement entities frequently have 
the unfortunate and yet undeniable necessity to 
investigate cases of Child Exploitation Materials (CEM) 
online.  While many sites on the Internet are built 
explicitly for hosting this illegal content, often utilizing 
anonymization tools to cover their tracks [1, 2], an 
interesting finding was noted during a 2016 
investigation in which the Bing search engine appears to 
have led a consumer of adult pornography down a path 
toward search terms related to CEM during the subject’s 
image searches. This was done through the use of 
suggested searches. As is later shown, Microsoft has 
since resolved this issue and has done much over the 
years to combat online CEM [3, 4, 5, 6]. However, these 
search suggestions are important to note for those 
attempting to create a detailed accounting of the choices 
and actions made by individuals viewing this type of 
material. The authors will provide resources to assist an 
analyst in creating a detailed timeline of the actions 
taken by the user when an “it wasn’t me, it was the 
search engine” defense could possibly come into play.  
1.1. Background 
Bing currently ranks as the second-most popular 
search engine behind Google [7]. No academic research 
exists comparing the differences in usage statistics 
relative to explicit content, however, The Daily Dot 
published an article in 2014, updated in 2017, reporting 
on the frequented opinion that Bing is used more for 
explicit content than Google. A side-by-side 
comparison of the search engines was performed by the 
Daily Dot, both with SafeSearch turned off, showing 
much more responsive images returned by Bing than 
Google when searching for explicit content [8]. If true, 
this could explain, though not excuse, Bing’s potential 
to provide focused paths toward very specific types of 
explicit material, as it would have had more data from 
which to learn.   
The trend in criminal cases related to CEM over the 
last 20 years has steadily increased. A study by Wolak 
et al in 2012 found that arrests for technology‐facilitated 
child sexual exploitation crimes increased by more than 
300% between 2000 and 2009. [9] Additionally, the U.S 
Department of Justice published an interim report to the 





Attorney General providing statistics for 2010 and 2011, 
showing an increase of 17.6% in cases accepted for 
federal prosecution in just one year. A joint paper 
authored by Google, NCMEC, and Thorn found that 
reports of online child exploitation materials are 
growing exponentially, noting that of the 23.4M reports 
of abuse materials, 9.6M (40%) occurred in 2017 alone. 
[10] The need for work in this area is an unfortunate 
reality and is increasingly important as these types of 
cases appear in federal court.  
Research indicates that viewers can devolve over 
time in their explicit searches from terms such as “young 
teen sex pictures” to eventually searching less 
ambiguous terms meant to eliminate the false positives 
for more explicit and often illegal content. [11] These 
terms can be gathered from Thumbnail Gallery Porn 
(TGP) sites, which do not host content themselves, but 
link to external sites instead, and Steel notes that 
viewers will sometimes  utilize search engines such as 
Google or Bing’s Image Search as a pseudo-TGP site. 
[11] Indeed, our investigation found that the subject 
utilized Bing in exactly this way. 
Steel later writes in a separate work that “[..]search 
engines are the most common method for finding 
content, including [Child Sexual Exploitation Material], 
on the Internet.”  Steel goes on to claim that “[d]espite 
legal defense arguments that individuals ‘stumble 
across’ child pornography, there is little evidence of 
individuals accidentally finding child pornography 
when surfing the web for legal content. As such, child 
pornography must be actively sought out by online 
offenders.” [12] This paper shows that this may not 
always be the case. The research in this paper aims to 
inform the community that the Bing search engine 
previously suggested search terms directly related to 
CEM, which could be used to provide evidence to the 
contrary that offenders must always be actively seeking 
this material, as well as provide a helpful method for 
detailing the explicit actions taken by a user. The 
authors discuss the methodology used to unravel the 
meanings behind Bing’s URL parameters in hopes that, 
as the web changes, others will be able to utilize similar 
methods in their own investigations.  While the focus of 
this paper is on the use for investigations involving 
CEM, its application is by no means limited to these 
types of investigations. 
Finally, several of these parameters have been 
updated since the initial case study presented in section 
2. As they are likely to change again, this paper is not 
meant to act as a long-term guide for all of the various 
URL parameters (and their meanings) that an analyst 
may encounter, but instead an explanation during a 
snapshot in time, as well as a helpful resource for 
anyone wishing to understand the processes used here at 
a future date should the need arise. 
1.2. Existing Research 
Little to no research has been done on tracing a 
user’s activity and determining activities through the use 
of Bing URL parameters, and the authors have located 
no research to date which has combined this with a focus 
on investigating child exploitation. Browser forensics, 
however, is not a new topic. Resources such as [13, 14, 
15] detail the vast trove of artifacts which can be 
extracted from a computing system. 
Horsman provides recent technical notes on various 
searching functions of several popular browsers, 
however, only two of Bing’s FORM parameters are 
described (RESTAB and QSRE)[16]. 
The closest available tool for parsing Bing’s FORM 
parameters is the URL forensic tool “Unfurl” [17]. 
Unfurl will break down the various components of a 
URL and also provides generic parsers for encoded 
information within that URL, such as timestamps, 
UUIDs, and base64 data. However, when used with a 
Bing image search URL, Unfurl simply reports the Bing 
FORM parameters with no context to their meaning. 
Additionally, while Unfurl works well to provide a 
visual breakdown of the components of a single URL, 
Lantern is designed to not only define the FORM 
parameters, but also ingest the many entries located 
within browser history files. This gives Lantern the 
ability to then create a timeline of user activity, detailing 
each step taken by a user in order to arrive at a particular 
image. The authors believe this work could immediately 
benefit tools such as Unfurl by providing context to 
currently unknown URL components. In particular, 
Unfurl currently has at least one open issue on Github 
noting minimal information within the Bing search URL 
parser 
(https://github.com/obsidianforensics/unfurl/issues/88). 
In 2019, the New York Times published an 
investigation into online child exploitation images, and 
found that “[b]oth recirculated and new images occupy 
all corners of the internet, including a range of platforms 
as diverse as Facebook Messenger, Microsoft’s Bing 
search engine and the storage service Dropbox” [18]. 
Additionally, there has been a great deal of research 
done on the psychology of individuals that seek out 
CEM [19, 20, 21], but a good deal of these studies 
mostly focus on the likelihood that offenders will 
become contact sex offenders.  There has been no 
research done on how the suggestions or results of a 
search engine may influence the user with respect to 
searching for pornography, or how the suggestibility of 
terms may influence the actions of the user. 
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1.3. Overview 
In section 2, we give a brief real-world example of 
the path taken through Bing search suggestions 
originating from a manual search for adult pornography 
to a search consisting of terms associated with child 
exploitation.  In section 3, we discuss our research 
motivations and methodologies, providing an overview 
of our results. In section 4, we discuss the tool created 
by the authors to automate the analysis of Bing URL 
results. In section 5, we make use of the provided tool 
in order to create a timeline of events. In section 6, we 
discuss the positive efforts by Bing and Microsoft to 
combat online CEM. In section 7, we discuss areas of 
future work. In section 8, we provide our conclusions, 
commenting briefly on the implications for both 
investigators and technology companies. 
2. Bing Suggested Searches: Real-World 
Example 
Around September 2016, the authors were made 
aware of an incident in which a subject was suspected 
of visiting a site identified by a popular web-filter as 
known Child Exploitation Material. Working 
backwards from the alerted URL, the analyst in charge 
of examination for this case was able to determine 
(through artifacts local to the system as well as network 
traffic log data) the events leading up to the subject 
having accessed this known contraband site. The subject 
had been utilizing the Internet Explorer 10 web browser 
on a Windows 7 operating system. Magnet Forensics 
Axiom was used to extract the WebCacheV01.dat 
browser cache files located in 
[ROOT]\Users\[user]\AppData\Local\Mic
rosoft\Windows\WebCache\. 
The subject’s actions began with a Bing image 
search for the term “down blouse,” and by clicking 
through progressive suggestions made by Bing, ended at 
image searches for terms such as “boy girl 10y fu**” 
and “13Y webcam.” The terms “10y” and “13Y'' are 
common occurrences in cases of child exploitation - ‘y’ 
or ‘yo’ is meant as a shortened version of “year-old”, 
and thus in this instance, these terms would be referring 
to “10-year-old” and “13-year-old”. It’s important to 
note that none of these clearly contraband search terms 
were ever actually typed by the subject, instead having 
only been selected from a list of suggestions made by 
the Bing search engine. In some instances, Bing made 
new suggestions based on the subject’s clicking on a 
particular image. When an image is selected in the Bing 
image search grid, it is enlarged, and suggestions related 
to that specific image will appear, providing a way to 
fine-tune additional searches. This lack of deliberate 
search action by the user led the authors to attempt to 
recreate a specific timeline of events in order to establish 
a detailed account of the specific actions taken by the 
user, as it could be argued in court that the subject never 
actually performed any searches beyond the initial query 
for “down blouse”.  
A listing of terms, extracted from the Bing search 
URLs, which were pulled directly from the WebCache 
local to the subject's system, is shown below. As was 
shown, and is discussed later, only item #1 was 
manually typed by the user. The rest of the terms were 
suggested to the user by Bing, requiring only for the user 
to click on the suggested term of interest.  
1. down blouses for 2015 
2. Accidental Downblouse Nipple 
3. Teen School Nip Slip 
4. Teen School Girls 
5. Cute Girls 
6. Cute Teen Girls 
7. Cute Girls Nude 12Y 
8. Boy Girl 10Y Fu** 
The authors noted the use of “FORM” as URL 
parameters in the data, and began working to attribute 
these IDs to specific actions taken by the subject, which 
resulted in the ability to generate an accurate timeline of 
operations actively taken by the subject, despite not 
having manually typed search terms. After the case was 
closed in 2019, the authors have worked to ensure the 
findings are made available to analysts who may find 
them useful. 
3. Motivation and Methodology 
As investigators began reviewing the web traffic 
located on the subject’s system, the use of various URL 
parameters for different search strings appeared to 
indicate that these parameters were tied to specific 
actions being taken by the user. As a full understanding 
of these user actions was very relevant to the 
investigation, investigators began attempting to recreate 
the steps taken, documenting those steps, and each new 
URL parameter as it was noted.  
These concepts were then used to form the basis for 
further research conducted by the authors to understand 
each of the possible URL parameters employed by Bing 
for image searches. 
When utilizing Bing for image searching, users 
have numerous methods to ultimately arrive at a 
particular image or site, all of which appear to have their 
own unique URL parameters. Testing showed that there 
are many ways that a user can arrive at the Bing image 
search grid, to include clicking on suggested images or 
search terms made by the main Bing web search page, 
directly searching Bing Images using search 
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terms,  clicking a suggested search term based on an 
initial search, or selecting a suggested search term after 
selecting an image located during a previous search. An 
example is shown here in a sample URL from the real-




The authors noted that the “FORM=IDMHDL” 
parameter here indicates a user arrived at image results 
by scrolling down a previous image results page and 
clicking a suggested term listed in the search bar 
“stickied” to the top of the page.  It quickly became 
apparent, however, that a different parameter can 





FORM parameter IRIBEP indicates that the user arrived 
at Bing image results by having selected the Bing-
suggested thumbnail of an image located at the top of 
the search results page, which was categorized by the 
Bing search engine as "People interested in ‘Teen 
School Girls’ also searched for ‘Cute Girls’”. 
Tests utilizing Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, 
Internet Explorer, and Safari browsers, as well as both 
Mac OS and Windows operating systems revealed that 
the Bing FORM parameters do not change with either of 
these variables. The authors began by manually stepping 
through each of the common actions a user may take 
during an image search, such as scrolling, clicking on 
images, opening thumbnails, or following links. For 
each action, the authors then noted the unique URL 
parameters generated by that step action. Each result 
was independently confirmed by a separate analyst, and 
each test was executed multiple times with various 
searches to ensure correctness.  
A full and complete listing of the documented Bing 
URL parameters can be found at 
https://github.com/lanterntool/lanter
n/blob/master/parameters.md. The listing is 
by no means meant to provide complete coverage of all 
possible actions a user may take; however, the authors 
do believe it provides a reasonable account of the most 
common user actions. A sample of that data is shown in 
Table 1 in order to provide an example of the type of 
translations that can be made from URL parameters to 
actions taken by a user. 
 
Table 1: Example of "translated" Bing FORM Parameters 
Parameter Description of Meaning 
FORM = 
RESTAB 
Indicates the user arrived at results by 
having previously manually typed a 
search term and then selected the Bing-
suggested search term 
“[search_string]” located at the 
top of the page. 
FORM = 
ISTRTH 
Indicates the user arrived at Bing 
image results by having selected 




Indicates the user arrived at Bing 
image results by having selected the 
Bing-suggested search term 
“[search_string]” located in the 
“Related Content” panel on the right 
which appeared as a result of the user 
having selected a thumbnail image on a 
previous result in order to view the 
full-size image within the browser. 
4. Lantern  
The most immediately applicable contribution of 
this paper is the Lantern tool, which can be downloaded 
from 
https://github.com/lanterntool/lanter
n/releases and utilized by examiners today. This 
tool is a single automated utility that encapsulates the 
manual URL analysis described in this paper by 
allowing examiners to load a CSV file of the URL logs 
retrieved from a subject’s system in order to produce a 
translated “timeline” of events based on the 
interpretation of known Bing URL parameters. This can 
be done independent of the browser or operating system 
used. URL logs such as these can be exported in CSV 
format from common forensic tools, such as FTK, 
Encase, or Axiom. Results from Lantern will include a 
chronological timeline of the “plain language” user 
action events, as well as incorporate the actual user 
search strings into the timeline as well. 
Lantern includes a full GUI, coded in Electron, a 
framework for building cross platform applications 
using JavaScript, HTML, and CSS. The full source code 
can be reviewed at 
https://github.com/lanterntool/lanter
n/, and the authors welcome additional improvements 
from the community. 
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5. Applying Bing URL Parameters to 
Understand User Actions  
The listing of the Bing URL parameters discussed 
in section 3 allows us to step through a virtual 
reenactment of the actions taken by a user interacting 
with the Bing Images search page. Utilizing the case 
study presented in section 2, our research can be applied 
by an analyst in order to make a detailed accounting of 
the choices made by the subject. The below narrative 
was created with the tool provided by the authors in 
order to automatically parse URL data, and represents a 
portion of the logs discussed in section 2 which the 
authors deem particularly representative of the 
suggestions made by Bing: 
1. On 2016-09-27 at 17:34:50 UTC URL 
parameter QBIR indicates the user arrived at 
results by having manually input the search 
string “down blouses for 2015” on a Bing 
image search result page. 
2. On 2016-09-27 at 17:34:57 UTC URL 
parameters IRPRST and thid=OIP indicates 
the user clicked on a thumbnail image 
(mediaurl=[redacted]) visible in the results 
page of a search for “down blouses for 2015” 
in order to view the full-size image within the 
browser. 
3. On 2016-09-27 at 17:35:09 UTC URL 
parameters IDMHDL indicates the user arrived 
at results by having scrolled part way down a 
previous image search results page until a 
secondary search bar appeared at the top of the 
page and then the user selected “Accidental 
Downblouse Nipple” from the Bing 
suggestions in this secondary search bar. 
4. On 2016-09-27 at 17:35:54 URL parameter 
RESTAB indicates the user arrived at results 
by having previously typed a search term and 
then selected the Bing-suggested search term 
“Teen School Nip Slip” located at the top of 
the page. 
5. On 2016-09-27 at 17:37:49 URL parameter 
IRIBEP indicates the user arrived at Bing 
image results by having selected the Bing-
suggested thumbnail of an image located at the 
top of the search results page which was 
categorized by the Bing search engine as 
"People interested in [initial search] also 
searched for “Teen School Girls””. 
6. On 2016-09-27 at 17:38:33 URL parameter 
IRIBEP indicates the user arrived at Bing 
image results by having selected the Bing-
suggested thumbnail of an image located at the 
top of the search results page which was 
categorized by the Bing search engine as 
"People interested in [initial search] also 
searched for “Cute Girls””. 
7. On 2016-09-27 at 17:38:56 URL parameter 
RESTAB indicates the user arrived at results 
by having previously manually typed a search 
term and then selected the Bing-suggested 
search term “Cute Teen Girls” located at the 
top of the page. 
8. On 2016-09-27 at 17:55:17 UTC URL 
parameters IRPRST and thid=OIP indicates 
the user clicked on a thumbnail image 
(mediaurl=[redacted]) visible in the results 
page of a search for “Cute Teen Girls” in order 
to view the full-size image within the browser. 
9. On 2016-09-27 at 17:55:47 UTC URL 
parameters IDMHDL indicates the user arrived 
at results by having scrolled part way down a 
previous image search results page until a 
secondary search bar dropped down from the 
top of the page and then the user selected “Cute 
Girls Nude 12Y” from the Bing suggestions in 
this secondary search bar. 
10. On 2016-09-27 at 17:56:12 UTC URL 
parameters IRPRST and thid=OIP indicates 
the user clicked on a thumbnail image 
(mediaurl=[redacted]) visible in the results 
page of a  search for “Cute Girls Nude 12Y” in 
order to view the full-size image within the 
browser. 
11. On 2016-09-27 at 17:56:27 UTC URL 
parameters IDMHDL indicates the user arrived 
at results by having scrolled partway down a 
previous image search results page until a 
secondary search bar dropped down from the 
top of the page, and then the user selected “Boy 
Girl 10Y Fu**” from the Bing suggestions in 
this secondary search bar. 
These 11 steps taken by the user allowed the 
authors to show specific action and choices made by the 
subject, providing a forensic argument against the 
possible defense that the subject was not intentionally 
seeking this material out. These steps (particularly steps 
9 through 11) also clearly illustrate the previous 
problem of Bing having been suggesting terms known 
to be associated with CEM. 
6. Microsoft’s Efforts to Combat Online 
Child Exploitation Materials  
Around July 2019, which is several years after the 
initial incident discussed in section 2 where these 
findings were documented, the authors attempted in part 
to recreate the search suggestions noted in section 2 and 
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found that Bing was no longer suggesting these terms 
related to contraband. Even when starting farther down 
the original search progression utilizing search terms 
such as “teen” or “young cute,” Bing refused to 
contribute suggestions that may lead toward CEM. With 
Safe Search turned off, and in a sanitized browser 
environment, the most related search term suggestion by 
Bing noted during author testing was “cute,” which is a 
common term not indicative of age, and “high school,” 
which when followed simply led the viewer to pictures 
of high school buildings.  
Overall, Microsoft has made significant efforts to 
combat online child exploitation materials. According 
to their online help article titled “How Bing delivers 
search results”:  
“The production and distribution of, and access to, 
child sexual abuse materials is universally condemned 
and generally illegal. ... Bing works with others in 
technology and industry groups, law enforcement, and 
governmental and non-governmental organizations to 
help stop the spread of this horrific content online. One 
way we do this is by removing pages that have been 
reviewed by credible agencies (or identified via 
Microsoft PhotoDNA) and found to contain or relate to 
the sexual exploitation or abuse of children.”[3] 
In 2009, Microsoft partnered with a group at 
Dartmouth College to create PhotoDNA, a new method 
of image matching. This software was provided to the 
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children 
(NCMEC) [source/site] and has greatly aided in their 
fight against Internet Service Providers (ISPs) hosting 
child exploitation materials. [4] 
Microsoft has also tested the use of advertisements 
to warn searchers that seeking child exploitation 
materials was illegal, encouraging the searcher to seek 
help. This resulted in a 67% drop in searches for child 
exploitation materials according to one study [5].  
In 2013, Microsoft partnered with Google to help 
block illegal searches and remove results that are linked 
to Child Exploitation Materials. "It will be much harder 
to find that content on both Bing and Google. We are 
blocking content, removing content, and helping people 
to find the right content or also sources of help should 
they need that” said Nicola Hodson, Microsoft's general 
manager of marketing and operations. [6]  
7. Future Work  
While the authors have provided a listing of the 
most common Bing URL parameters for image 
searching, there are several next steps which proceed 
naturally from this work.  
First, while the original nexus for the research 
focused solely on image searches, it was noted during 
this process that Bing’s Web and Video searches made 
use of similar, and often overlapping, parameters. 
Extending the work to include any category of search 
would allow the community a broader application. 
Second, these parameters are subject to change over 
time. Future work will create a web crawling utility to 
automatically document any updates to these URL 
parameters in the GitHub page for Lantern. Not only 
will this eliminate the need for manual review of URL 
parameters, but it will also allow for a historic 
documentation of URL parameters collected at various 
points in time, including the most current, allowing both 
forensic analysts and researchers to use our work to 
view a record of ID mappings during particular points 
in time, even if they have since changed. 
Future work will also include updates and 
improvements to the Lantern tool. These updates will 
include being able to parse native web logs retrieved 
from a subject system, as opposed to needing to export 
the logs to a CSV, as well as automatically recognizing 
the date of the search queries, allowing Lantern to 
retrieve the most accurate URL parameters documented 
at that time (by the efforts of future work noted above.) 
Lastly, search engines such as Google, Yahoo, or 
DuckDuckGo appear to utilize their own custom URL 
parameters for image searching, and future work will 
apply this same methodology to each of these search 
engines in turn, documenting unique components of 
these various URLS, and ultimately allowing Lantern to 
parse a wider range of URL logs collected from browser 
history files. 
8. Conclusions  
Through the use of a unique 2016 case study, this 
work has documented a real-world example of 
Microsoft’s Bing search engine offering increasingly 
inappropriate suggestions, resulting in clearly 
contraband search terms, which had never been 
manually typed by the subject. This created a situation 
in which investigators were required to make a detailed 
timeline of the explicit actions taken by the user based 
on URL parameters alone, as it could have been argued 
that the user had not typed these searches, and therefore 
could not be held responsible for their appearance. This 
work led to the methods presented here, resulting in the 
first known large-scale documentation of the Bing URL 
FORM parameters. The authors also have provided a 
simple tool based on their results which can translate 
these URLs into an easily understandable timeline of 
events. 
Ultimately this paper speaks to a larger topic of 
awareness and responsibility for both the IT industry 
and investigators when it comes to the potential 
repercussions of utilizing machine learning and artificial 
intelligence, particularly when any user online can 
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provide input for training. The IT industry has a 
responsibility to consider how to avoid dangerous 
occurrences like blindly making search suggestions in 
their implementations and opt for inclusivity, safety, 
equity, and security first. Additionally, practitioners 
within these fields should be looking for these types of 
anomalies and behaviors when conducting inquiries into 
incidents believed to be exclusively the result of human 
interaction with computers, as results may not always be 
what they appear. Understanding this technology can 
help shed light on the facts of an incident when the 
potential means by which the person acted can be 
questioned.  
While the issue with the suggestion of child 
exploitative search terms noted in this paper has been 
resolved by Microsoft, the authors envision other 
situations in which this work may be beneficial to the 
community both for research and practical forensic use, 
such as searches related to the radicalization of 
individuals online or the understanding of searches 
which may have been false positives (such as 
misspellings). We hope that this will assist other 
researchers who may encounter a situation requiring an 
understanding of the actions of the user behind the 
keyboard when the user may not have been manually 
typing search terms. 
9. References  
[1] C. Guitton, "A review of the available content on Tor 
hidden services: The case against further development.", 
Computers in Human Behavior 29, no. 6 (2013): 2805-
2815. 
[2] M. Spitters, V. Stefan, and M. van Staalduinen. "Towards 
a comprehensive insight into the thematic organization of 
the tor hidden services.", In 2014 IEEE Joint Intelligence 
and Security Informatics Conference, pp. 220-223. 
[3] Microsoft. “How Bing Delivers Search Results.” Bing 
Help. Accessed August 23, 2019. 
https://help.bing.microsoft.com/#apex/18/en-
us/10016/0. 
[4] Lohr, Steve. “Microsoft Tackles the Child Pornography 
Problem.” The New York Times. The New York Times, 
December 16, 2009. 
https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/microsoft-
tackles-the-child-pornography-problem/. 
[5] T. Ly, L. Murphy, and J.P. Fedoroff. "Understanding 
online child sexual exploitation offenses.", Current 
psychiatry reports 18, no. 8 (2016): 74. 
[6] Ward, Mark. “Google and Microsoft Agree Steps to Block 
Abuse Images.” BBC News. BBC, November 18, 2013. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-24980765. 
[7] “Search Engine Market Share United States Of America.” 
StatCounter Global Stats. Accessed July 27, 2019. 
http://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-
share/all/united-states-of-america. 
[8] Dickson, E J. “How Bing Became the Search Engine for 
Porn.” The Daily Dot, March 2, 2020. 
https://www.dailydot.com/debug/bing-porn-search-
engine/. 
[9] J. Wolak, D. Finkelhor, and K. Mitchell, “Trends in law 
enforcement responses to technology-facilitated child 
sexual exploitation crimes: The Third National Juvenile 
Online Victimization Study (NJOV-3)”, Crimes against 
Children Research Center, Durham, NH, 2020. 
[10] E. Bursztein, E. Clarke, M. DeLaune, D.M. Elifff, N. Hsu, 
L. Olson, J. Shehan, M. Thakur, K. Thomas, and T. 
Bright, "Rethinking the detection of child sexual abuse 
imagery on the Internet.", In The World Wide Web 
Conference, 2019, pp. 2601-2607 
[11] Steel, Chad MS. Digital child pornography: A practical 
guide for investigators. Lily Shiba Press, 2014. 
[12] M.S. Steel, “Web-based child pornography: The global 
impact of deterrence efforts and its consumption on 
mobile platforms”, Child Abuse & Neglect, Volume 44, 
June 2015, Pages 150-158. 
[13] Rathod, D., 2017. Web browser forensics: google 
chrome. International Journal of Advanced Research in 
Computer Science, 8(7), pp.896-899. 
[14] Rathod, Digvijaysinh. "Mac osx forensics." International 
Journal of Advanced Research in Computer 
Engineering & Technology (IJARCET) 6, no. 8 (2017). 
[15] Said, Huwida, Noora Al Mutawa, Ibtesam Al Awadhi, 
and Mario Guimaraes. "Forensic analysis of private 
browsing artifacts." In 2011 International Conference 
on Innovations in Information Technology, pp. 197-
202. IEEE, 2011. 
[16] G. Horsman, "A forensic examination of online search 
facility URL record structures.", Journal of forensic 
sciences 64, no. 1 (2019): 236-242. 
[17] Benson, Ryan. “Introducing Unfurl” dfir.blog. dfir.blog, 
June 11, 2021. https://dfir.blog/introducing-unfurl/. 
[18] Keller, Michael H., and Gabriel J. X. “The Internet Is 
Overrun With Images of Child Sexual Abuse. What 
Went Wrong?” The New York Times. The New York 
Times, September 29, 2019. 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/09/28/us/ch
ild-sex-abuse.html. 
[19] Taylor, Maxwell, and Ethel Quayle. Child pornography: 
An internet crime. Psychology press, 2003. 
[20] L. Webb, J. Craissati, and S Keen. "Characteristics of 
Internet child pornography offenders: A comparison 
with child molesters.", Sexual abuse: a journal of 
research and treatment 19, no. 4 (2007): 449-465. 
[21] K.C. Seigfried, R.W. Lovely, and M.K. Rogers, "Self-
Reported Online Child Pornography Behavior: A 
Psychological Analysis.", International Journal of 
Cyber Criminology 2, no. 1, 2008. 
 
Page 7554
